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Abstract: Recently, political models which employ lottery-selection instead of bal-
lot voting have been proposed. Proponents argue that such lottocratic models can 
improve the representation of the population and reduce undemocratic influences. 
In this paper, I argue that these proposals also satisfy the egalitarian requirement 
of democracy. I claim that having an equal chance to be selected by lot is equally 
egalitarian as having an equally weighed vote for two reasons: first, having a chance 
to be selected by lot satisfies the requirement for political justice better than elec-
toral democracy and second, it provides citizens with an equal chance on political 
influence and not merely equal impact.
Keywords: lottocracy, procedural democracy, political equality, political fairness, 
egalitarian democracy.
1. Introduction
It is widely held that democracy is the most desirable political system, at least amongst those currently at choice. Nevertheless, it has always been 
questioned and debated whether or not there are political systems that could 
be preferred, and if so, why. For instance, several authors have doubted that 
democratic systems can claim any authority towards their citizens at all (cf. 
i.a. Estlund 2008; Huemer 2013). And although it is broadly defended that 
political systems should be democratic in order to be legitimate, democracy is, 
however, a very vague concept that allows for a high range of different pro-
1 Mail to: julia.jakobi@uni-hamburg.de.
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cesses and organizational characteristics. Originally, the term “democracy” 
derives from the ancient Greek words “demos”, the people, and “kratos”, 
strength (cf. Robertson 2004, 136). Thus, literally speaking, any form of 
government might be considered democratic as long as the political power 
is ultimately in the hand of the totality of the (adult) citizens and no smaller 
group has the power to rule. One famous definition of democracy describes it 
as “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (Lincoln 1863).
It is often assumed that a government by the people requires a general 
and equal right to vote for all citizens. But historically speaking, elections 
have not always been an element of democracy. In ancient Greece, for exam-
ple, political offices were distributed via lot amongst all citizens2 (cf. Fuchs 
2009, 39f ). Discussions and deliberation on political decisions were held in 
public during which every citizen was allowed to express his opinion on a 
topic. The randomly selected citizens were then in charge to enact the politics 
decided upon. Officials were replaced every year so that almost every citizen 
held a political office at least once in a lifetime (Ibid., 40). As a result of an in-
creasing population such inclusive democracies were replaced by representa-
tive democracies: market-place discussions were transferred into parliament 
and lottery selection was replaced by elections as an element of participation 
and inclusion of the general public (Ibid., 41). Nowadays, only states which 
hold elections are considered democratic, but, from a historical point of view, 
elections have not always been taken as a necessary element of democracy.
Recently, political theorists have proposed different lottocratic models 
which reintroduce the use of lotteries as an element of political systems (cf. 
i.a. Fishkin, 2009, 2018; Guerrero, 2014; López-Guerra, 2011; Saun-
ders, 2010; Van Reybrouck, 2018). They argue that through lottery-selec-
tion the participation of the general public could be enhanced, the impact 
of lobbyists and economic interests reduced, the demographic representation 
of the population enlarged and the acceptance of controversial political deci-
sions improved. Experiments with randomly selected citizen assemblies have 
generated positive results both in terms of the quality of the decisions and of 
the perception of the decision-process (cf. i.a. Berbner et al. 2017; Fishkin 
2018; Van Reybrouck 2016). 
When it comes to justifying democracy as the desirable political sys-
tem, mainly two lines of argumentation are employed: democracy is stressed 
to be valuable for either instrumental or egalitarian reasons. Instrumental 
accounts of democracy argue that, compared to other decision-methods, 
democratic decision-making generally leads to good and epistemically valu-
2 Only men of a certain class were considered decent citizens; women, slaves and other people 
from lower and working classes were not included in the selection of politicians.
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able results (cf. i.a. Arneson 2009; Estlund 1997). Egalitarian arguments 
of democracy, by contrast, refer to the intrinsic value of equality which is 
inherent to the method and independent from the consequences of the deci-
sion. Such intrinsic arguments stress the importance of procedural fairness 
and the general virtue of the equality of all citizens (cf. i.a. Christiano 
1996a; 2018).
If one generally accepts that democratic systems are justified, then, 
in order to legitimate the aforementioned lottocratic proposals, it has to be 
justified that such systems would satisfy the instrumental and the egalitarian 
value of democracy or it has to be shown that only one of these dimensions 
is relevant in order for something to be a legitimate and desirable political 
system. Generally, I follow the first of these approaches and assume that 
a political system should satisfy the instrumental and egalitarian require-
ments. In this paper, however, I focus merely on the egalitarian value of 
lottocracy. The aim of this paper is to show that lottocratic systems satisfy 
the intrinsic and procedural value of democracy in a relevant way despite 
depriving people of their general right to vote, a right which is typically con-
sidered the characteristic of equal participation in political decision-making. 
I will not address the epistemic quality of the proposed lottocratic model. I 
consider the quality of the decisions taken a necessary criterion for legitimat-
ing a political system, but I have to leave the evaluation of this quality for 
another discussion.
The criticism raised against electoral democratic systems is to a certain 
degree unfair: whenever it comes to evaluating lottocratic proposals one can 
only discuss ideal, potential designs of them, while the criticism brought for-
ward against electoral systems is based on non-ideal, actual realizations. In 
what follows, I do not intend to argue that the lottocratic proposal is the only 
system which could mitigate the problems of current electoral democracies, 
nor that electoral systems could not be improved in a way to avoid some of 
the criticism. Instead, I want to evaluate the democratic potential of such lot-
tocratic models in terms of political equality.
I will begin by giving a brief introduction to how a particular lotto-
cratic system is supposed to work (Section 2). I will then outline why politi-
cal equality is generally considered a necessary element of a desirable politi-
cal system (Section 3). Next, I will discuss two possible understandings of 
political equality and question to what extent the lottocratic model could 
satisfy them: first, political equality as political justice (Section 4) and second, 
political equality as vertical equality of influence (Section 5). Finally, I will 




In this paper, I will focus on one extreme proposal for lottery-selection 
within political systems put forward by Alexander Guerrero (2014). He pro-
poses a model which he calls Lottocracy and in which politicians would no 
longer be elected but be randomly selected out of the totality of all citizens 
currently entitled to vote. Other proposals in a similar vein discuss lottery-
selected assemblies with advisory functions (Fishkin 2009; 2018), distributing 
the right to vote by lottery (López-Guerra 2011) or randomly selecting one 
final decision out of all votes casted (Saunders 2010). I will focus on Guer-
rero’s proposal for two reasons: I consider it most comprehensive and promis-
ing in order to address the criticism put forward against electoral democracies 
and it builds on positive empirical findings made in so called citizen assemblies 
and mini-publics (cf. i.a. Fishkin 2009).
The basic idea of a lottocracy is that politics are no longer made by an 
elected parliament but by members of the society, which are randomly drawn 
by lot from the totality of all citizens currently entitled to vote3. In order to get 
a better grasp of the idea of lottocracy I will briefly outline some of the main 
points of Guerrero’s proposals. Nevertheless, my arguments do not hinge on 
the specific set-up of the system but basically on the fact of replacing a right to 
vote by a chance to be selected.
Guerrero is very detailed in explaining some of the aspects of the sys-
tem but completely leaves aside others. He only focuses on the composition 
and operation of the legislative branch, the parliament, but does, for exam-
ple, not address the selection of the executive branch, the government. In 
Guerrero’s proposal, the randomly selected people would become full-time, 
paid politicians for three years. They would get relevant expert-input on politi-
cal topics, participate in deliberations and become empowered and qualified to 
take informed decisions on topics relevant to the society. Every year one third of 
the selected people would be replaced by a new lottery in order to ensure a con-
stant workflow while at the same time rotating the group of politically active 
people and frequently integrating new and unbiased perspectives. People would 
not be obliged to serve once they are drawn, but the financial incentives would 
be considerable and the civic culture should be developed in a way that serving 
as a politician is “one of the most significant civic duties and honors” (Guer-
rero, 2014: 156). Guerrero points out that, considering the current costs of the 
3 Whether there should be restrictions such as a maximum age, health conditions or a crimi-
nal history to exclude people from the possibility of being selected is one of the practical issues 
that this paper does not focus on, as well as the question whether people could be obliged to 
take over a political office.
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political system in the United States, each selected member of the legislature 
might be paid something between US $500,000 and US $1,000,000 per year. 
Already smaller amounts than these should make it highly attractive for the 
larger part of the population to assume a political job for three years especially 
since efforts would be made to accommodate family and work schedules, pro-
vide relocation expenses and to guarantee the return into former jobs4. There 
should be some mechanisms to exclude people who frequently do not show 
up, who show up intoxicated or who are disrespectful or offensive, but these 
mechanisms would have to be set in a way that they “protect those who simply 
are unlikable or who have divergent views” (Ibid., 156).
An intensive deliberation phase, consisting both of expert-input and ex-
tensive discussions with other members or the legislature, who might have 
very different attitudes or social background, is one of the core elements of 
the lottocratic system5. In addition to the internal deliberation, Guerrero pro-
poses that the selected politicians should also interact with the general public 
somehow, for example through virtual discussion platforms or, better, by going 
back into their home regions and holding something like town-hall meetings 
or panel discussions. Thereby, they could both inform nonmembers about the 
issues and proposals under discussion and gather information of the public’s 
opinions and concerns (Ibid., 162). 
This paper will not question the practical setup of the system nor the 
quality of its decisions. Questions that would have to be answered are how the 
experts should be selected, whether people can be forced to become politicians, 
whether there should be a combination of elections and lotteries, who would 
take on representative functions and the like. I will skip all such considerations 
and, given the positive results of different experiments with randomly selected 
citizen-assemblies, assume that integrating the general public into the political 
4 For reasons of individual freedom and autonomy it seems highly disputable whether one 
could force someone to spend three years of her life in a job that he or she has not chosen volunta-
rily, to serve the society in a way that most other citizens never do and to interrupt whatever other 
occupation he or she is currently following. Such an obligation would require a substantial justifi-
cation that will not be further pursued or debated in this paper. It would have to be discussed else-
where to what extent the quality of the system might be questioned if participation is voluntary.
5 The selection of these experts is one crucial point in Guerrero’s proposal to ensure the 
quality of the decisions and the absence of manipulation and unfair influences. It requires a 
“qualification assessment process” to determine if a person counts as an expert and an “expert 
selection process” to decide which qualified experts are given the opportunity to speak. I will not 
further discuss a feasible mechanism of expert selection here. For the course of this paper it shall 
suffice to assume that some good and fair way of integrating experts into the process could be 
established. Moreover, when it comes to criticizing the influence of experts, it should be kept 
in mind that all currently practiced political systems do in some way build on advisory services, 
which are oftentimes not strictly regulated or democratically legitimated.
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system by lottery selection instead of by ballot voting is somehow promising. 
In the following, I will focus on the question whether such a system could 
claim to fulfill the egalitarian virtues of democracy.
3. The Value of Equality
Before entering into the analysis of different possible interpretations of 
political equality I will briefly mention some general assumptions on why it 
is considered valuable at all. There are two lines of arguing for equality as the 
relevant criterion and justification of democracy: One that stresses the intrinsic 
value of equality and one that values the procedural advantages of equal con-
sideration given the epistemic limits of knowledge and agreement. The value 
of equality of all human beings is widely accepted and, inter alia, stipulated in 
the first article of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are en-
dowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood.
Although many philosophers have tried to argumentatively prove the 
desirability of equality, it is often accepted to have an intrinsic value that needs 
no formal proof (cf. i.a. Rawls 1971)6. As Thomas Christiano puts it
It is an elementary requirement of justice that individuals ought to be treated 
equally if they are equal in the relevant ways and may be treated unequally if 
they are unequal in a relevant way. Each person has an equally important life to 
live, so there is a strong presumption in favor of his or her interests being given 
equal consideration (Christiano 1996b, 33).
A second line of argument that justifies democracy due to its egalitar-
ian value stresses the procedural fairness of democratic systems. Proceduralist 
justifications of democracy favor fair procedures as the relevant criterion for 
justifying democracy. They argue that it is sometimes difficult to identify the 
epistemic quality of political decisions and that due to the existing pluralism 
of values and the lack of shared convictions on morality, religion, the best 
economic system and the like, it is often difficult to reach an agreement about 
controversial decisions which may not have only one, correct result (cf. Cohen 
1996, 18). Proceduralists therefore stress the procedural value of democracy, 
6 For interesting counter positions to this assumption see i.a. Frankfurt (1987; 2000).
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arguing that the fact of being a fair and egalitarian procedure gives people 
reasons to accept decisions which might not be clearly judgeable on epistemic 
grounds (cf. Estlund 1997, 174f ). 
Given the difficulty of reaching content-based agreement, proceduralists 
argue that it is more important to focus on decision procedures that can be 
accepted by everyone affected. They claim that the virtue of being an “intrinsi-
cally fair political procedure […] can outweigh some shortfall in production 
of good consequences” (Arneson 2009, 200) and that electoral democracy7 
delivers fair results because it takes into account the opinion of every citizen 
equally. Thus, democracy leads to a solution that appropriately considers the 
different opinions present in a society. Procedural arguments build on the in-
trinsic value of equality and rate it higher than the ideal, but according to them 
unrealizable, aim of epistemically best decisions.
Of course, merely procedural justifications of democracy are frequently 
criticized. It is often argued that majority rule can lead to unfair, undesirable and 
content-wise inferior results. Moreover, critics claim that a merely procedural 
approach to political decisions is problematic since it is self-defeating: if disagree-
ment on matters of principle are to be solved by fair procedures, how ought one 
decide which procedure is fair, given the disagreement on principles? (cf. Chris-
tiano 1996b, 35). On the other hand, proponents of proceduralism stress the 
intrinsic value of treating people equally and consider democratic majority rule 
an intuitively desirable system. In this paper, I am not concerned with solving the 
disagreement between proceduralists and instrumentalists and will not further 
discuss criticism against both positions here. Given the amount of convincing 
arguments for egalitarian positions, I will assume that a desirable political system 
has to somehow accommodate the value of equality. As Charles Beitz states it, 
“no theory of democracy that failed to give the egalitarian idea a central place 
could possibly yield a faithful representation of the extraordinary grip of democ-
racy on the modern political imagination” (1989, xi). The proposed lottocratic 
model would deprive people of one important form of equal participation: it 
would replace their equal vote by only an equal chance on becoming selected as a 
politician. Several interpretations of political equality exist and I will show how 
lottocratic models satisfy some relevant interpretations of political equality and 
why they do so even better than current electoral democratic systems. In what 
follows, I will elaborate on two interpretations of political equality and the re-
spective egalitarian potential of a lottery-based political system.
7 Throughout this paper, I will often refer to what is commonly considered a democracy – to 
electoral, representative democracy – when I speak of “democracy” although I want to challenge 
whether not a system with universal lottery selection of politicians instead of elections could be 
called democratic as well.
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4. Political Equality as Political Fairness
I will first consider a procedural interpretation of political equality 
and suggest that political equality ought to be understood as political fairness. 
When it comes to claiming political equality necessary for something to be a 
desirable political system, it has to be defined how political equality should 
be interpreted. The claim for political equality demands to establish fair 
terms of participation which treat all citizens as equal and in a fair manner. 
Formulations such as “providing everyone with an equal say in politics” or 
“providing everyone with an equal opportunity to influence politics” are often 
used synonymously, but I want to put forward that egalitarian requirements 
towards a political system can be satisfied by an equal but relevant opportu-
nity on significant influence, even without providing everyone with an equal 
say. Lottocratic systems would deprive people of an equal say in politics but 
provide them with an equal chance on relevant influence. 
Political equality is often said to imply that the power to take po-
litical decisions is equally in the hand of all people. The adequate decision 
procedure to enact popular sovereignty is often assumed to be one which 
provides every citizen with an equal say in political decisions. According to 
most egalitarian democrats, “political equality implies that each and every 
citizen ought to have a say” (Christiano 1996b, 45) in political decisions. 
I want to argue that providing people with an equal say is one interpretation 
of political equality but not the unique or best one. To say that the people 
are sovereign and govern themselves does not necessarily mean that everyone 
has to have an equal say. In electoral democracies, all citizens have an equal 
vote but every vote has a very small actual influence. An equal vote seems to 
rather a symbolic than consequentialist value. But what I take to be, what I 
take to be the more relevant interpretation of political equality is to have an 
equal opportunity on meaningful political participation. 
Let me support this claim with some numbers8. In Germany, in the 
last elections 61.5 million people were entitled to vote. They elected 709 
Members of Parliament. If everyone had participated in the elections, the 
voice of every voter would have had an impact of 0.0012% on the election 
8 In the following, I will build my argumentation on numbers and ratios from Germany. It 
might make a slight difference if the number of people living in a jurisdiction is significantly 
smaller, but I assume that mathematics of large numbers would lead to similar results in most 
democratic states. The figures are only approximate and simplified calculations. I will not fur-
ther discuss the German electoral system with its particularities of a so-called mixed-member 
proportional representation or the like. I only provide these numbers in order to catch a glimpse 
of the dimensions under discussion here.
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of one member of the parliament. In other words: every Member of Parlia-
ment is elected by 86,700 people; every vote influences the composition of 
the parliament by 0.0000017%. 
How relevant is the voice one has in politics if every four years one can 
influence the election of one of about seven hundred Members of Parlia-
ment by a share of 0.0012%? Given these numbers, I question if the claim 
for political equality, expressed by an equal say, should be interpreted to be 
a consequential claim. Instead, I consider it to be a rather symbolic claim. I 
grant that political equality should be understood as equalizing the public 
status of democratic citizens (cf. Beitz 1989, 16f ), but I do not think that 
this is best done by providing everyone with an equal vote. I do not question 
that providing people with equal votes is a possibility of realizing a certain 
kind of political equality, but I question if it is the best we can do in order to 
achieve meaningful political equality. Instead, I suggest that political equal-
ity should be understood as providing citizens with equal procedural oppor-
tunities to influence political decisions. Charles Beitz equals the opportunity 
to influence political decisions with having equal power over outcomes (cf. 1989, 
4f ), but I doubt that these two interpretations of equality do indeed imply 
the same. As I have pointed out above, it is questionable whether practically 
all citizens can be provided with a relevant power over political outcomes at 
all. I do not question the claim for procedural fairness, but I suggest that 
political equality can also be realized by an equal distribution of access to rel-
evant political influence. Although the lottocratic proposal does not provide 
everyone with power over political outcomes, it does provide an equal op-
portunity on influence.
Ronald Dworkin argues that the aim of any political process should 
be to improve equality of political power (cf. Dworkin 1987, 117f ). He in-
terprets political equality not necessarily as an equal say in politics but as an 
ideal striving for an equal distribution of political power. Elections are only 
one means to provide people with political power, but a very un-influential 
one. As I have pointed out, actual numbers suggest that providing people 
with one vote every four years does not provide every single one of them 
with significant power at all.
When the opportunity of gaining political power is evaluated, not 
only the active right to vote but especially the passive right to become elect-
ed should be considered. Although, legally speaking, in most electoral de-
mocracies every adult has both an active and a passive voting right, it is 
questionable to what extent the passive right to vote is indeed realized. The 
necessity of a significant financial wealth for becoming a politician in the 
US is frequently discussed, but also in Germany systemic hurdles prevent 
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people from becoming politicians with actual, significant influence9. Politi-
cal offices are mainly accessible to people with a solid financial background 
and a relatively high educational level. Research suggests that the passive 
voting right, the right to become an eligible candidate, is in many societies 
effectively not realized10 (cf. i.a. Guerrero 2014; Helm 2017). In Germany, 
beside of the elected members of the parliament, between 1000 and 4000 
people can be considered to constitute a powerful, political influential but 
not democratically legitimated elite, as sociologists specialized in researching 
social elites state (cf. i.a. Cwiertnia 2018; Hartmann 2018). 
When it comes to equalizing access to real political power, provid-
ing people with an actually equal chance of becoming a politician seems to 
be more promising than to provide people merely with a right to vote. To 
equalize the distribution of political power, systemic hurdles have to be re-
duced and the access to political offices has to be improved. Regarding such 
an equal distribution of political power, a lottocratic system would provide 
people with an actual chance on political power. In most electoral democra-
cies, all people are provided with an equal vote but effectively only few are 
provided with a possibility to become politically influential. I do not suggest 
that lottocracy is the only way to improve the access to political offices or 
that electoral democracies could not be improved with regard to a more ef-
fective realization of a passive voting right. What I want to point out here is 
that the lottocratic proposal does realize a relevant claim for political equal-
ity and does so better than electoral democracies currently do maybe even 
better than they can do in an ideal realization, given that elections always 
require some kind of pre-selection of eligible candidates.
So far, I have suggested that political fairness is a sufficient realization 
of the requirement of political equality. I have argued that political equality 
has a rather symbolic than a consequentialist value if it is provided by giving 
9 The political scientist Marion Reiser found that candidates in the parliamentary elections 
have to finance large parts of their election campaigns privately. The political scientist Bern-
hard Weßels states that the direct candidates of the largest two parties paid in average between 
10,500€ and 6,600€ of their private money for their campaigns which were financed to only 
13-50% by their parties (cf. Helm 2017). In the US, campaign financing is even way more 
expensive (cf. Guerrero 2014).
10 The accessibility of political offices can be doubted, given that the composition of the 
parliament is not at all representative for the composition of the society. The last German par-
liament consisted of academics by 91% while the society as a whole consists of less than 15% 
academics (cf. Schmidt-Mattern 2015; Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). Migratory back-
grounds and age structures are equally underrepresented in the parliament. Legally it is pro-
vided, but effectively it is questionable if young, female migrants really have the same passive 
voting right a fifty-year-old German men.
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people one vote in elections. The political power one has by having one vote 
is so small that a system that provides the citizens with actual influence in 
a fair way might be more promising. What is important to realize political 
fairness is that people are treated as equals and have equal access to political 
offices, but this does not necessarily imply that all political rights have to 
be distributed equally amongst all. The requirement of political fairness can 
be sufficiently satisfied as long as the terms of participation are such that 
no citizen has sufficient reasons to deny them, given the general desire to 
come to an agreement on some mechanism of participation. A fair, political 
system should not exclude any member from a right on political participa-
tion or discriminate against anyone based on gender, race, education or the 
like. I have outlined that the current electoral system tends to discriminate 
some people based on their social, educational and financial backgrounds 
and that therefore some people hardly have access to actual influence, since 
their right to vote has almost no impact. To support this claim that people 
have reason to strive for a political system that provides them with a relevant 
impact, I will elaborate on a relevant understanding of political influence in 
the next section.
5. Political Equality as Vertical Equality of Influence 
To illustrate further the demand for equalizing the distribution of po-
litical power, I want to build on a distinction proposed by Ronald Dworkin. 
Dworkin differentiates, on the one hand, between horizontal and vertical po-
litical equality, on the other hand he understands political equality as either 
equality of influence or of impact. This distinction might help to illustrate 
what kind of equality lottocratic systems can provide and especially provide 
better than electoral democratic systems.
With horizontal equality he refers to an equal political power amongst 
individual citizens or groups of individuals. With vertical equality he refers 
to an equal political power between private citizens and individual officials 
(cf. Dworkin 1987, 121). Such vertical equality seems to be both unrealis-
tic, because it is impossible to provide every citizen with the same power as 
a congresswoman or the president, and not necessarily desirable regarding 
the complexities of political systems and the capacities required to take good 
political decisions. To demand that every single citizen has the same impact 
on political decisions would undermine the concept of representation, which 
aims to transmit the power of the citizens to some chosen, competent repre-
sentatives. 
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Nevertheless, to ignore the vertical inequality of power, between the 
citizens on the one hand and some selected politicians or otherwise influential 
elites on the other hand, contradicts the claim for political equality. Electoral 
democracies might be said to realize an equal horizontal power amongst all 
people, but this does not yet satisfy the requirement of an equally distributed 
political power if one understands political power as “the capacity to realize a 
possible desire, or to get what one wants, despite resistance” (Beitz 1989, 8). 
Having one equal vote does not provide one with the same power as an elect-
ed politician or a member of the influential elite. To demand only equality 
of horizontal power seems to be no sufficient criterion for a system to satisfy 
the claim for political equality in a relevant way: even in a totalitarian system 
all people (except the dictator) have the same horizontal power – none – and 
also in a one-party-system every person has the same say – one vote – but 
no actual choice and influence on political outcomes. Thus, a merely equal 
distribution of votes amongst all citizens is not a sufficient requirement for a 
fair distribution of power. What is necessary instead is to provide them with 
an equal and relevant impact on politics. Even if a system provides everyone 
with an equal and influential vote, one cannot claim that such a system actu-
ally provides everyone with the same power: only a selected amount of people 
– the elected politicians and some other influential people – is provided with 
effective political power, while the actual influence of the will of every single 
voter is questionable. 
Dworkin, therefore, introduces another relevant dimension for measur-
ing the quality of political power: the distinction between equality of impact 
and equality of influence. These categories can be described as follows:
someone’s impact in politics is the difference he can make, just on his own, by 
voting for or choosing one decision rather than another. Someone’s influence, 
on the other hand, is the difference he can make not just on his own but also by 
leading or introducing others to believe or vote or choose as he does (Dworkin 
1987, 122)
The influence one has depends on non-constitutional facts such as “the 
power of charisma or reputation or association or skill or threat or bribe or 
other advantages that give any one person influence over the political acts 
of anyone else” (Ibid.). Although having a same vote provides one with the 
same impact, such non-constitutional facts make the actual influence of every 
voter unequal. Given the above-mentioned non-constitutional conditions 
like charisma or potential of bribery, the opinions of some people are more 
influential than the opinions of others. When these more influential people 
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change their opinion, they have the power of changing the voting-behavior 
of others. Although they still possess only one, equally weighed vote, they can 
convince others to change their votes accordingly. When a non-influential, av-
erage voter changes her opinion, this does only change one single vote. While 
the political structure, the voting rights and the constitutional facts of a com-
munity are relevant for the impact of every single voter, the non-constitutional 
power of charisma, reputation, network and others determine the influence of 
a single voter.
This distinction helps to solve the dilemma stated above: vertical equal-
ity of impact is impossible and horizontal equality of impact is not necessar-
ily significant. But vertical equality of influence would indeed improve the 
responsiveness of a political system and horizontal equality of influence could 
solve the problem of minorities not having any chance of imposing their in-
terests. As mentioned above, the simple condition of a same vote does not say 
a lot about the quality of a democracy. Equal impact, therefore, is not neces-
sarily a relevant criterion for a fair distribution of political power. Equal influ-
ence is a more helpful concept instead. It includes such relevant features as 
a right on freedom of speech and association, which are necessary virtues for 
a system to be a democracy. Someone’s impact in politics is not smaller than 
someone else’s impact if one of them is denied the freedom of speech while 
guaranteed a right to vote, but his political influence is reduced unfairly if he 
is denied such a right to speak. 
The concept of horizontal equality of influence can also help to ex-
plain another serious complaint about current democratic systems, namely 
the fact that some financially or medially powerful people have disproportion-
ally more political power than others although they are only citizens and no 
elected politicians (cf. i.a. Guerrero 2014; Hartmann 2018). Such people 
have the same impact as any other voter but they have more influence due to 
their networks and their possibilities of reaching and influencing other peo-
ple. According to Richard Arneson it is especially a difference in horizontal 
influence that we consider unfair. A society is considered more democratic 
the closer it comes to achieving equality of influence, that is, the more inde-
pendent access to political offices and influence on political decisions become 
from social status, social networks, sex, race, education level and the like (cf. 
Arneson 2009, 199).
The distinction between equal impact and equal influence helps to 
justify the egalitarian value of lottocracy. I will argue that providing eve-
ryone with an equal chance to gain considerable influence by being drawn 
by lot outweighs the deprivation of a guaranteed but minimal equal impact 
through a right to vote. Given the aforementioned intrinsic value of equality 
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and procedural fairness, I take it as granted that political power should be 
distributed equally11. 
I have elaborated earlier on the mathematically small weight of every 
single vote (cf. i.a. Arneson 2009, 201; Kolodny 2014, 218). I take this as a 
starting point in order to support the claim that an effective chance on influ-
ence is in a relevant way more egalitarian and therefore more important than 
a guaranteed right to vote. Mathematically speaking, the chance of becoming 
drawn by lot as a politician would still be pretty small. Nevertheless, in a lot-
tocratic system the access to political influence would become more egalitarian 
because systemic and contingent hurdles to democratic access would be re-
duced. Electoral democracies provide every citizen with the same impact, but 
proponents of lottery-based proposals criticize the very fact that political influ-
ence is distributed highly unequally in electoral democracies12: mainly contin-
gent factors such as charisma, financial power and social networks influence 
who becomes politically influential. The impact of such contingent factors 
could be cut out, or at least significantly reduced, in lottocracies and effectively 
everyone would have the chance to gain political influence, also people from 
lower social strata, with lower educational levels or smaller social networks. 
Electoral systems, at least as they are designed and practiced at the mo-
ment, do effectively not provide everyone with an equal chance on political 
influence. As Aristotle puts it, elections are oligarchic and only the lot is demo-
cratic, because elections do already preselect certain candidates to be eligible, 
while lottery-selection does provide everyone with the possibility to become 
selected (cf. Aristotle, 350bc (1885) book IV, part ix, 1294b). Electoral sys-
tems, as they currently are, are not egalitarian for two reasons: on the one 
hand, the passive right to be eligible is effectively not realized for everyone; on 
the other hand, the politicians eligible do oftentimes not provide one with the 
possibility of being demographically represented, that is represented in terms of 
age, educational background, values or the like. The process of elections is in 
a certain way selective, thus that the elected politicians and people politically 
committed are over all not demographically representative to the society and 
11 Besides of the intrinsic motivation of this demand, proponents of equal access to political 
power also stress the instrumental value of including as diverse opinions and skills as possible 
in political decision making. Critics question whether the benefits of cognitive diversity and 
descriptive representation do really outweigh the cost of losing the presumably positive traits 
of charisma, personal motivation and expertise which elected politicians might have. Again, I 
have to leave this discussion of instrumental arguments to another occasion and will focus on the 
equality of access to political influence here.
12 Again, this is not supposed to imply that lottocracy is the only way to reach such an impro-
vement. Electoral systems might be improved in a way to provide people with an equal chance 
on influence, but I am concerned with pointing at the egalitarian potential of lottocracy here 
and not with suggesting improvements of electoral democracy. 
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therefore their opinions are likely not to cover all topics or options relevant to 
the different groups of the society. In a lottocracy, people from all social strata 
could be selected and would be more representative for the society as a whole 
than current politicians13. 
The concept of demographic representation is important for my claim that 
lottocracy would distribute political influence more equally than electoral de-
mocracy. Representation is considered an institutional device to make demo-
cratic decision-making possible when numbers are too large (cf. Landemore 
2013, 105). Representation can be understood as “acting for someone” or “de-
scriptively standing for someone” (cf. Pitkin 1972). Arguments for a form of 
political representation, where some people are selected in order to act for oth-
ers mainly build on some special abilities these selected have, such as rhetorical 
competence or intellectual expertise on a topic. But this causes the problem 
that elections “tend to bring to power socially and economically homogenous 
people. [… These] people are likely to share some personality traits (a type A 
personality, say) or other characteristics that may reduce the overall cognitive 
diversity of the assembly” (Landemore 2013, 108). This cognitive diversity 
is what a descriptive understanding of representation aims at. Research has 
shown that the quality of decisions highly depends on the amount of different 
perspectives included in a decision, rather than on the cognitive ability of every 
single participant of the deliberation. The Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem 
holds that “a randomly selected collection of problem solvers outperforms a 
collection of the best individual problem solvers” (Page 2007, 163)14. Empiri-
cal experiments have shown that “groups of average citizens perform decently 
well when placed in the right deliberative conditions” (Landemore 2013, 
109). If the aim is to reproduce the diversity of the society, elections are not 
the best way of ensuring this, since, at least in current electoral systems, they 
13 Considering the laws of probabilities, it is of course not guaranteed that a lottery-based 
parliament could represent all minorities of a society, it is not even guaranteed that social struc-
tures would be roughly mirrored at all. Nevertheless, what lottery-based selection could overco-
me at once are systemic hurdles, which currently hinder some people from becoming eligible or 
elected. Lottery-selection is of course not the only way to solve this problem and ideal electoral 
democracies would not impose such systemic hurdles. Still, probabilities are higher in lottery-
selected groups than in election-based systems that members of currently under-represented 
groups get selected. A completely random selection cannot ensure the representation of mino-
rities but makes it more likely than the current election system. Some proponents of lottery-
based systems propose to implement quota in order to ensure the representation of minorities. 
I cannot elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages of such proposals here further but am 
aware of the need to address the problem of ensuring the representation of minorities, which I 
claim lottery-selection could provide, elsewhere. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing 
out the need to clarify this.
14 For an interesting and illustrative description of this see Landemore (2013, 99-102). 
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tend to bring to power people with similar personality traits and social back-
grounds. When it comes to descriptive representation, random lotteries would 
produce “‘an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large’, ensuring a 
statistical similarity of thoughts and preferences of the rulers and the ruled” 
(Ibid., 108). In order to reach as much cognitive diversity as possible, without 
knowing beforehand which perspectives, concerns and convictions might be 
needed to come to the best solution, “it seems that the best solution is not to 
choose but to leave it up to chance and the law of large numbers” (Ibid., 115).
The claim for descriptive representation blurs the line between the pro-
cedural and the instrumental quality of democracy. Although I generally want 
to exclude content-related arguments in this paper, including the quality of de-
liberation has definitely both a procedural and an epistemic aspect. The argu-
ment for aiming for a descriptive representation rather than for a representation 
in the sense of acting for someone builds on the epistemic quality of the decision 
taken. But the consequence of demanding such a descriptive form or represen-
tation is a procedural one. In order to generate a descriptive representation of 
the society, the procedure of random selection is more feasible than elections. 
If one understands representatives as actually “communicating” with the 
people they represent, and as merely expressing their opinions, then demo-
graphic representation might be rather irrelevant. But if one understands rep-
resentation as representing the people’s attitudes and cognitive abilities, then 
descriptive demographic representation becomes more important (cf. Pitkin 
1972). The problem of political representation is that a political representative 
is “neither an agent nor a trustee nor deputy nor commissioner; he acts for a 
group of people without a single interest, most of whom seem incapable of 
forming an explicit will on political questions” (Ibid.). Therefore, the most 
relevant understanding of representation seems to be to mirror the opinions 
present in a society. Political representation should ensure that the opinions 
of all people are equally present in a governmental action, and this is likely to 
be realized better when the people are descriptively represented and not merely 
acted for by someone.
I can now consolidate the two lines of argument developed above. I have 
spelled out why the desirable form of political equality should be an equal 
influence rather than an equal impact. Besides, I argued that political represen-
tation should be rather descriptive than in the sense of acting for someone. Elec-
tions provide everyone with an equal impact but with only a limited access to 
political influence. The impact of every single vote is diminishingly small and 
insignificant. The chance on actual political influence is distributed very un-
evenly in electoral democracies and would be distributed fairly in lottocracies. 
Given the fact that, practically speaking, not everyone can have a significant 
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influence, I argued that descriptive representation is more promising in order to 
ensure that everyone’s interests are addressed than an acting-for representation. 
In order to mirror the attitudes and the diversity of the society, random selec-
tion is a promising procedure to distribute the chance on influence procedur-
ally fair and to reproduce the cognitive diversity of the society. Even if one is 
not selected, one’s own interests and attitudes would probably be represented 
better in a demographically descriptive parliament than in a parliament where 
one has merely the chance to elect people which tend to be mainly from one 
social strata.
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to examine the egalitarian quality of so called 
lottocratic political systems. At first glance, depriving people of their right to vote 
might seem to violate the basic requirements of political equality and partici-
pation. Still, I claimed that lottocratic systems do nevertheless satisfy a relevant 
understanding of equality. 
First, I pointed out that electoral democracies are highly un-egalitarian 
themselves when it comes to equality of influence or the representation of 
demographic facts. I argued that an equal chance on being selected can be 
considered a sufficient realization of procedural accounts of democracy and 
therefore satisfies the requirement of political fairness. Second, I put forward 
that given the minimal mathematical impact of every single vote and given the 
merits of a descriptive account of representation, vertical equality of influence 
should be considered a more relevant form of political equality than a guaran-
teed equal but small impact. 
Having shown that lottocratic systems can be considered egalitarian in a 
relevant sense, the legitimacy of lottocratic systems seems to depend mostly on 
their instrumental value and the epistemic quality of their decisions. This issue 
is, however, left for future research. 
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